The ‘sanction‑policy’ linkage from the perspective of citizens and the role of the party system by Fumarola, Andrea
Vol.:(0123456789)
Acta Politica (2021) 56:181–204
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00155-7
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The ‘sanction‑policy’ linkage from the perspective 
of citizens and the role of the party system
Andrea Fumarola1 
Published online: 15 April 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
Research on dynamic representation stresses the effect of electoral incentives on 
politicians’ motivation to pursue policies in line with the preferences of the major-
ity of the citizens. However, comparative research on the so-called sanction-policy 
link is still limited. The present article assesses the anticipatory effect of electoral 
accountability on government responsiveness from the perspective of citizens across 
25 European countries. Results confirm the strong positive relationship between per-
ceptions of electoral accountability and assessments of government responsiveness. 
Finally, the article examines the potential moderating effect of specific party system 
characteristics on people’s attitudes. Using multilevel models to analyse survey data 
from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the study shows that the link 
between perceived accountability and responsiveness is conditional upon specific 
characteristics of the party system, namely fragmentation and volatility.
Keywords Responsiveness · Accountability · Public opinion · Party system · 
European social survey · Multilevel analysis
Introduction
Research on dynamic representation describes elected representatives as ‘rational 
actors’ that make decisions in the present with the aim to maximize their utility in 
the future (Erikson et al. 2002, p. 289). The rational anticipation of future electoral 
behaviour would trigger representatives to consider voters’ preferences in the for-
mulation of public policies (Erikson et  al. 2002; Manin et  al. 1999; Mansbridge 
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2003; Pitkin 1967). This mechanism, which assures popular control and connects 
citizens to governments, is described as the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage and constitutes 
the final ramification of the chain of representation (Powell 2004). However, this 
relationship might not be always perfectly linear, given that electoral accountability 
shows consistent variation across countries depending on contextual and individual-
level factors (Hobolt et  al. 2013; Pérez Durán 2016; Singer 2010). Therefore, the 
present article investigates how strong the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage in Europe is, 
and analyses how people’s perceptions of accountability influence their attitudes 
regarding government responsiveness. This alternative perspective would provide 
an effective understanding of the functioning of democratic representation. Using 
citizens’ evaluations of democratic quality not only allows to mirror the macro-level 
approach employed to study the effect of electoral incentives on responsiveness in 
comparative perspective (Bernardi 2018; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010), but it also provides a meaningful complementary ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective to it (Pickel et al. 2016).
Knowledge about the link between accountability and responsiveness across 
countries is still limited. Although extensive research investigates responsiveness 
and its determinants (Esaiasson and Wlezien 2017; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Stimson et  al. 1995; Wlezien 1995), empirical studies 
linking responsiveness and electoral competition across countries are still rare (Ber-
nardi 2018; Cho 2010; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). 
More specifically, comparative research on the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage is virtually 
non-existent, so that the question of how electoral accountability affects responsive-
ness across countries has so far not been investigated. The present article seeks to 
contribute to the literature on political representation by assessing this relation-
ship from the perspective of those who are the first recipients of accountability and 
responsiveness in representative democracies: the citizens. The study therefore com-
pares public attitudes in 25 European democracies cross-sectionally.
The second aim of this study is to analyse how the ‘sanction-policy’ link varies 
across European countries according to specific characteristics of the party system. 
In representative democracies citizens traditionally voice their concerns through 
gatekeepers with the function to aggregate their demands and communicate them 
to elected officials. Political parties have, in fact, the potential to improve govern-
ment’s responsiveness by articulating citizens’ preferences and constituting (Easton 
1965; Schmitter 2000; Strøm 2000). The influence of political institutions on the 
link between accountability and responsiveness has been mostly analysed in single 
case studies or a limited number of Western countries, while only recent research 
analyses this topic using medium and large-N samples (Blais and Bodet 2006; 
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Rasmussen et al. 2018; Soroka and Wlezien 2015; 
Wlezien and Soroka 2012). However, these studies provide contradictory evidence, 
mainly due to the different way in which they conceptualize representation, as either 
electoral representation (Golder and Stramski 2010; Powell 2000) or in between 
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elections responsiveness1 (Erikson et al. 2002; Esaiasson and Narud 2013; Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010). Moreover, there is very little or no evidence on the potential 
conditional role of party system characteristics on the link between accountability 
and responsiveness. Because of the proven effect of specific party system charac-
teristics—namely fragmentation, volatility, polarization—on the single compo-
nents of the sanction-policy linkage, I expect these elements to condition the way in 
which perceptions of electoral accountability influence evaluations of government 
responsiveness.
I use cross-sectional data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS) to test the ‘sanction-policy’ link across 25 European countries. Results reveal 
that individual assessments of government responsiveness are positively associated 
with perceptions of electoral accountability. It means that citizens are more likely to 
evaluate their governments as responsive when they also perceive that they can hold 
them accountable for their performance. Moreover, analysis shows that this linkage 
is conditional upon specific configurations of the party system. Less fragmented and 
less volatile contexts are likely to strengthen the relationship between responsive-
ness and accountability, while no association is found for party system polarization. 
The analysis of individual-level attitudes confirms that responsiveness and electoral 
accountability are two separate but strictly related dimensions whose relationship is 
mediated by the party system. This implies that citizens should not underestimate 
the direct role of electoral control to improve government responsiveness, but also 
its indirect beneficial effect for the legitimacy of the whole political system.
Responsiveness and electoral accountability: the ‘sanction‑policy’ 
linkage
Responsiveness is traditionally considered a crucial dimension of democratic qual-
ity because of its positive impact on the legitimacy of the political system (Bowler 
2016; Dahl 1971, p. 201; Easton 1965; Esaiasson et al. 2017; Scharpf 2006). In its 
‘dynamic’ conception, as originally developed by the seminal works of Erikson, 
MacKuen and Stimson (2002) and Soroka and Wlezien (2010), democratic repre-
sentation is described as the response undertaken by governments in terms of policy 
outputs to a shift of the majority of citizens in terms of policy preferences. Accord-
ing to this view, public opinion functions as a ‘thermostat’ (Soroka and Wlezien 
2010; Wlezien 1995). If citizens do not react to changes in policy, then politicians 
‘would have little incentive to represent what the public wants’ (Wlezien 1995, p. 
982). From this perspective, democratic representation would consist of a ‘bottom-
up process’ enabling citizens to influence the policy-making process (Esaiasson and 
Wlezien 2017).
1 For a systematic review of the literature on the two ways in which representation can occur, see Arnold 
and Franklin (2012).
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The correspondence between representatives’ actions and the preferences of the 
majority of citizens2 ‘cannot depend solely on the good will of policy makers’ (Pow-
ell 2004, p. 92) but it also requires effective (electoral) institutions which assure 
popular control and connect citizens to governments. Competitive democratic the-
ory widely stresses the relevance of democratic procedures, arguing that the pres-
ence of competitive elections turns out to be a strong incentive for responsiveness 
given that parties and politicians want to be re-elected (Bartolini 1999, 2000; Dahl 
1971; Manin et al. 1999; Powell 2000, 2004). Powell (2004) describes representa-
tion as a chain of causal processes in which the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage—resulting 
in responsiveness—represents the main consequence of electoral accountability. In 
their work on the ‘between-election democracy’, Esaiasson and Narud (2013) sug-
gest that accountability could play a relevant role also during non-election times 
since representatives consider electoral participation the most effective instrument 
to influence the policy-making process. In the ‘between-election mode’ politicians 
dominate the representative relationship and the threat of future electoral sanction 
is the main and probably sole ‘means of power’ that citizens have to influence the 
policy-making process (Esaiasson and Narud 2013, p. 4). From this perspective 
electoral institutions have not only the function to select public officials, but also 
to control and make policies closer to public wishes (Ferejohn 1999). This concep-
tualization clarifies the distinction between these two important features of politi-
cal representation, i.e. electoral accountability and responsiveness, which are some-
times conflated by theoretical and empirical research.3 These are distinct but strictly 
interrelated phenomena. When citizens have little power to sanction them for their 
performance, politicians would consequently be less responsive because the popular 
control on their actions fades away. This mechanism will inevitably reflect on citi-
zens’ perceptions of democratic representation.
3 This is the case of the literature on ‘mandate responsiveness’ according to which parties offer distinct 
and clear policy choices to voters during electoral campaign. Once elected to power, government parties 
work to implement the ‘mandate’ received by citizens and, if they fail to do so, they should expect to be 
punished at the next election (Roberts 2014; Stokes 1997). However, the concept of mandate responsive-
ness seems to overlap the concept of ‘electoral accountability’ or, at least, to be one side of the same 
coin since both of them take place at the election time (in the past and future elections, respectively). It 
represents the ‘prospective’ component of performance voting that, together with the ‘retrospective’ one, 
constitutes the concept of electoral accountability. In this article the outcome variable is ‘policy respon-
siveness’ from the perspective of citizens which is a mechanism that take place between the elections 
(at present time t), clearly distinct from electoral accountability. The correspondence between citizens’ 
preferences and policy outcomes is theorized to be influenced by the prospect of an effective mechanism 
of punishment (or reward) in the next elections——at time t+1— as suggested by the extensive literature 
on retrospective performance voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Key 1966).
2 This principle represents Dahl’s (1989) idea of democracy according to which representatives should 
be responsive to what people want. However, responsiveness has been also conceptualized in terms of 
‘ideological congruence’ (Golder and Stramski 2010), i.e. how citizens and governments’ policy posi-
tions overlap in ideological terms according to the traditional left-right dimension (Mayne and Hakh-
verdian 2017). Other approaches analyse responsiveness also in terms of system support, conceived as 
trust in political institutions or satisfaction with democracy (Morlino and Quaranta 2014; Roberts 2014). 
The present article considers representation in its ‘dynamic’ conceptualization, namely policy respon-
siveness, and analyses it in terms of citizens’ perceptions.
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In line with Erikson and colleagues’ (2002) as well as Mansbridge’s (2003) con-
cept of ‘anticipatory representation’, I expect electoral accountability to influence 
responsiveness through an ‘action-reaction’ mechanism involving citizens and rep-
resentatives. This model considers politicians to be rational actors who make deci-
sions at the present to maximize their utility in the future. The desire of maximizing 
re-election chances and anticipate the consequences of future elections, is expected 
to make representatives more sensitive to changes in public opinion. However, only 
the existence of an effective mechanism of vertical accountability would be able to 
generate this rational anticipation and, in turn, dynamic representation. Those insti-
tutions that allow people to identify and assign responsibility for policy decisions 
would, in fact, expose governments to voters’ behaviour in future elections. The fear 
of punishment—or the ambition of reward—would persuade governments to take on 
policy positions that the majority of people will judge positively at the time of the 
next election. ‘Like antelope in an open field, they cock their ears and focus their full 
attention on the slightest sign of danger’ (Erikson et al. 2002, p. 320). This strategic 
shift would shape policy through the rational anticipation. Building on Friedrich’s 
law of ‘anticipated reactions’ (1963), Mansbridge (2003: 517) considers political 
uncertainty able to shape the behaviour of representatives that, in the attempt to 
increase their chances of re-election, try to ‘please future voters’ going along with 
citizens’ preferences. However, while it might be expected to impact government 
responsiveness (Dahl 1971; Miller 1983; Strøm 1992), political competition per se 
is not enough to ensure government responsiveness if it does not consider a broader 
system of performance evaluation.
This article broadens the scope by analysing the intimate connection between two 
dimensions of democratic quality—responsiveness and electoral accountability—
and its implication for the study of responsiveness across countries. According to 
Schedler (1999), electoral accountability is a multidimensional concept. It consists 
not only of an element of ‘enforcement’—represented by the vote used to reward 
or punish the incumbent government—but also of a dimension of ‘answerability’ 
concerning the possibility for citizens to demand and receive information about gov-
ernments’ action. This second feature, in particular, turns out to be essential to guar-
antee high levels of government responsiveness. Research shows that information 
asymmetries about public affairs might cause distortion to the measures of collective 
opinion, reducing the capacity of government responsiveness to the citizens whose 
needs will be pursued unequally (Althaus 1998). Wlezien (1995, p. 981) stresses 
that ‘democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well-informed 
about policy-making’ in order to adjust its preferences and, like a thermostat, influ-
encing government action. Hence, the multidimensional nature of the accountability 
concept encourages to assess its effect on political responsiveness.
However, the question concerning the way in which electoral accountability 
affects government responsiveness across countries has received surprisingly very 
little attention at the empirical level. A number of in-depth country-specific or small-
N comparative studies examines responsiveness at the aggregate-level considering 
different policy areas (Easton 1965; Hakhverdian 2012; Hobolt and Klemmensen 
2008; Jennings 2009; Pickup and Hobolt 2015; Soroka and Wlezien 2005). With 
the exception of Soroka and Wlezien (2015); Wlezien and Soroka (2012), large-N 
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comparative studies analysing the influence of electoral institutions on government’s 
response to public preferences are essentially missing. This article contributes to the 
literature on democratic representation in two ways. It provides a comparative analy-
sis of the relationship between electoral accountability and responsiveness in Europe 
while it studies this link using individual-level data. More specifically, it analyses 
how perceptions of electoral accountability influence attitudes regarding government 
responsiveness and tests whether the relationship varies across different contexts. 
The decision to adopt a different analytical perspective is driven by both theoreti-
cal and methodological reasons. The first reason lies on the relevance of supportive 
public attitudes for democratic legitimacy, conceived as both ‘input-oriented’ and 
‘output-oriented’ legitimacy (Easton 1975; Scharpf 2006). These two dimensions, in 
fact, involve both evaluations of institutional arrangements that ensure accountable 
governing processes (input legitimacy) and assessments of those policies adopted in 
the name of the majority of people (output legitimacy). Second, the measurement 
of the dependent variable as individual perceptions of government responsiveness 
is close to the one suggested by Powell (2004, p. 102) who considers it a reliable 
measure given citizens’ demonstrated ability to assess potential breaks in the chain 
of responsiveness. Third, variables based on citizens’ evaluations are more likely 
to grasp the nuances of the concepts because they do not apply a common set of 
criteria as macro-level indicators do, and they are tailored on the specific cases and 
account for substantial and cross-country variations (Pickel et  al. 2016). The last 
reason concerns the ‘evaluative’ nature of electoral accountability and responsive-
ness. These two relevant dimensions of democratic quality, in fact, rely consistently 
on the perceptions of citizens who are considered ‘the only possible judges’ of their 
own needs (Morlino 2011, p. 201). The use of individual-level data should therefore 
provide a relatively accurate perception of citizens’ preferences. These considera-
tions lead to formulate the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the perception of accountability, the better the assessment 
of government responsiveness.
Explaining variation in citizens’ perceptions: the impact of the party 
system
Building on the assumptions of institutional theory (Anderson and Singer 2008), the 
present article additionally aims to assess the extent to which the sanction-policy 
link from the perspective of the citizens varies across different institutional con-
texts. Comparative research on representation, conceptualized as both congruence 
and dynamic representation, emphasizes the role of institutions in shaping citizens’ 
perceptions although evidence about this effect is not entirely clear. These stud-
ies are mostly focused on decentralization, concentration of powers and, above all, 
electoral systems to analyse, in particular, the effect of disproportionality on cabinet 
size (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Powell 2000, 2011; Rasmussen et  al. 2018; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). Nevertheless, the potential 
effect of the party system on dynamic representation has been less investigated, 
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although Wlezien and Soroka (2012, p. 1425) stress that ‘there are other political 
institutions to consider as well, including party systems themselves’. Parties and 
party systems are, in fact, the bedrocks of contemporary democracy given the role 
of representation agents at different stages of society (Morlino 2011). They serve as 
organizing devices for voters’ political evaluations and judgements to influence the 
decision-making process (Borre and Katz 1973; Strøm 2000). A party system that 
mediates the relation between public opinion and policy is relevant for the function-
ing of the entire chain of representation, and in particular for the link between elec-
toral accountability and government responsiveness (Powell 2004). I consider three 
features of the party system: fragmentation, volatility and polarization. Although 
independent of each other, these elements have been traditionally analysed in con-
junction because of their capacity to capture the efficiency of the party system in a 
country (Quaranta 2015; Sartori 1976). While the literature has generally investi-
gated the direct effect of the party system on accountability or responsiveness, its 
conditional effect on the sanction-policy link is not completely clear.
Party system fragmentation
A number of studies shows how fractionalized party systems, i.e. political sys-
tems counting a high number of parties, have the positive function to provide 
citizens with a varied supply of political choices (Dalton 2008; Powell 2004). 
The effect of this institutional variable is widely analysed in the literature on 
descriptive representation and ideological congruence (Blais and Bodet 2006; 
Powell 2000, 2011); however, evidence about its consequences for dynamic 
representation in comparative perspective is quite limited (Rasmussen et  al. 
2018; Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). While this ele-
ment seems to be doubtless beneficial for political representation, it may also 
represent a greater limit to the functioning of the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage for 
two, connected, reasons.4 First, recent research on between-elections representa-
tion shows that fragmentation risks to short-circuit the policy-making process 
because it would make it difficult for coalition governments to coordinate their 
action thus hampering the capacity to respond effectively to citizens’ demands 
(Arce 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). Second, and 
most important, research on electoral accountability shows the detrimental effect 
a higher number of parties in the system has on representation. The dispersion 
of preferences among several and sometimes conflicting parties risks, in fact, 
to hinder the formation of a feasible, credible, governing alternative (Ander-
son 2000; Maeda 2010). Moreover, recent research reveals that the increase in 
party system fragmentation has significant consequences on the composition of 
4 Since the article analyses the moderating effect of party system characteristics, this article considers 
only the broader concept of party system fragmentation. Given that electoral accountability concerns the 
competitive dimension of democracy, it is of primary importance to analyse the moderating effect that 
the number of political parties competing at elections has on it, rather than considering only the number 
of parliamentary or government parties.
188 A. Fumarola 
oppositions—with or without parliamentary representation—rather than govern-
ments, irrespectively of the electoral systems. While governments seem to be 
relatively immune to its effect, an increase in party system size exerts severe 
effects on the role of oppositions in established democracies. When fragmenta-
tion is high, alternation in government becomes less likely, since opposition par-
ties are less likely to present themselves as credible alternatives to the govern-
ment as ‘they do not represent a cohesive set of political interests’ (Best 2013, 
p. 337). From this perspective accountability becomes more difficult, resulting 
in potential negative effects on perceived responsiveness. Politicians, free from 
any concrete threat of replacement, would be less responsive toward citizens’ 
preferences, preferring instead to undertake collusive behaviour (Bartolini 1999; 
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). Following these arguments, the first conditional 
hypothesis can thus be formulated:
Hypothesis 2 The positive effect of electoral accountability on responsiveness is 
stronger in less fragmented party systems.
Party system volatility
Party system volatility is traditionally considered, along with fragmentation, an 
important indicator of the ‘quality of representation’ (Arce 2010; Sartori 1976). 
According to the democratic theory consolidated regimes are characterized by recur-
ring and competitive elections between a group of political parties that is essentially 
stable along time (Morlino 2011). Voters who face almost the same party choices 
would find it easier to vote on the basis of the past political performance or future 
policy goals, making elections an opportunity to evaluate—retrospectively—incum-
bent’s performance or—prospectively—parties’ platform for future government 
(Dalton et al. 2012). On the other hand, new political parties need to develop a pro-
grammatic identity and attract a stable core of voters on that basis. The low degree 
of organizational structure could limit to their ability to represent voters (Mair and 
van Biezen 2001; van Biezen 2003). Gwiazda (2015) observes that the fluidity of 
the party system represents a problem for electoral accountability since it hinders 
citizens’ retrospective evaluation of political parties and elites. Conversely, low lev-
els of volatility might have positive consequences for dynamic representation ‘by 
facilitating legislative support for government policies; by channelling demands and 
conflicts through established procedures; by reducing the scope for populist dema-
gogues to win power; and by making the democratic process more inclusive, acces-
sible, representative, and effective’ (Diamond 1997, p. xxiii). Taken together, these 
elements indicate a potential positive effect of party system institutionalization on 
the sanction-policy link. This considerations lead to formulate the following condi-
tional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The positive effect of accountability on responsiveness is stronger in 
less volatile, more stable party systems.
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Party system polarization
Recent research shows the negative effect of party polarization on the ideological 
congruence between public opinion and government because of the more extreme 
positions taken by parties and that this effect would be greater in proportional sys-
tems (Blais and Bodet 2006; Dalton et al. 2012; Powell, 2011). While these findings 
have important implication for the research on electoral representation, this article 
focuses on the conditional effect of party polarization on the link between percep-
tions of electoral accountability and assessments of government responsiveness. 
However, empirical studies about party polarization and dynamic representation are 
virtually non-existent, while recent work suggests that the effect seems to be less 
straightforward and might depend on the nature of the electoral system (Wlezien and 
Soroka 2015, p. 279). Therefore I derive my theoretical expectations from the litera-
ture on party polarization and accountability. Gelineau and Singer (2015) show that 
this polarization would have beneficial effects on electoral accountability because it 
increases the ideological cohesion of government and makes it clearly distinct from 
opposition. This effect might have important consequences. The increased cohe-
siveness of the majority party (or coalition) in the determination of public policies 
would make it easier for voters to associate governments with policy performance 
and these perceptions ‘will have a greater effect on [incumbent’s] fortunes’ (Jones 
2010, p. 325). Voters would be able, in fact, to distinguish among available alter-
natives and express dissatisfaction with government policies in the next election 
(Hellwig 2011). Stiers and Dassonneville (2019) have found similar results for mul-
tiparty contexts. Because of its beneficial effects on accountability, polarization is 
expected to strengthen the sanction-policy linkage with important implications for 
policy responsiveness. The greater ‘identifiability’ of policymakers would increase 
the potential power of sanction of voters in the next election. Consistent with the 
rational anticipation model, the ideological cohesion of government is expected to 
provide a greater incentive for coalition parties to cooperate in order to promote pol-
icies in line with the preferences of the majority. These considerations lead to the 
third, and last, conditional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The positive effect of accountability on responsiveness is stronger in 
more polarized party systems.
Data and methods
To test the four hypotheses, I use individual-level data collected in the sixth round 
of the European Social Survey (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016) supplemented by data on 
national party systems collected at the country-level. The total sample is composed 
of 47,515 respondents.5 The 2012 ESS round is particularly suited for testing my 
5 The original sample consists of 54,673 respondents from 29 countries. However, given the presence 
of several missing values, a standard list-wise deletion risks to cause a consistent loss of data, leading 
to potential biased results. I thus employ a multiple (or multivariate) imputation by chained equations 
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expectations, as it includes questions regarding Europeans’ understandings and 
evaluations of democracy. I include 25 out of 29 countries.6 Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Brit-
ain, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. This module allows 
the use of different indicators to measure citizens’ evaluations of democratic perfor-
mance with specific questions about the single countries (Quaranta 2017). Among 
these indicators, the article focuses on public assessments of government respon-
siveness and perceptions of electoral accountability.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is an indicator of individual assessments of responsiveness 
combining two questions asking respondents whether they think it is better that the 
government changes policies according to what most people think (‘responsive-
ness’) or that the government sticks to its planned policies (‘unresponsiveness’):
[P]lease tell me how often you think the government in [country] today 
changes its planned policies in response to what most people think?
[P]lease tell me how often you think the government in [country] today sticks 
to its planned policies regardless to what most people think
Responses to these items range from 0 to 10, with zero indicating the case in which 
government ‘never’ adapts / sticks to its policies, and ten indicating the scenario in 
which it ‘always’ changes / sticks to its policies. I then reversed the scale of the sec-
ond item, so that the new variable combining responses to the two questions range 
from 0 (the government is perceived as unresponsive) to 10 (the government is per-
ceived as responsive). This methodological strategy allows to avoid a self-selection 
of the sample and to reduce the presence of missing values to be imputed. These 
two items are, in fact, preceded by a filter question asking how important govern-
ment responsiveness is for democracy. On the basis of their answer, respondents are 
asked one of the two questions shown above. I follow the same approach adopted 
in recent studies using these data (Goubin 2018; Linde and Peters 2018), not only 
for the acknowledged reliability of the constructed variable but also for its close-
ness to the one suggested by Powell (2004, p. 102) who recommends the use of 
citizens’ assessments of democracy ‘as a measuring rod’. Figure 1 shows the mean 
values of the new dependent variable for each country included in the analysis. The 
6 Since we are measuring specific dimensions of the democratic quality, we consider only those coun-
tries ranked as “Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World annual report (2013). For this reason, 
Albania, Kosovo, Russia and Ukraine are not included in the sample.
method (using the ‘mice’ package for R Studio 1.1.383) to impute the relevant missing values (van 
Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). The procedure consists in the replacement of the missing val-
ues with values obtained using a probabilistic model. Estimates are based on 5 imputed datasets with 50 
iterations combined according to Rubin (1987) to account for the nested structure of the data.
Footnote 5 (Continued)
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countries showing the highest scores are Switzerland and the Nordics. On the other 
hand, Central and Eastern European countries show the lowest scores.
Independent variable
The rotating module of the ESS 6 includes also a battery of questions capturing pub-
lic assessments of vertical accountability. The choice to select three specific items 
is driven by theoretical and methodological reasons. Electoral accountability is, in 
fact, a three-dimensional concept (Morlino 2011; Pickel et al. 2016; Schedler 1999). 
The first dimension is information, i.e. the importance of having a free and plural 
media system which provides citizens with alternative sources of information (Mor-
lino 2011; Norris 2017). The second dimension is justification, which indicates the 
possibility for citizens to obtain valid reasons that explain government’s decisions 
(Pérez Durán 2016; Schedler 1999). The third dimension is enforcement, i.e. the 
effective power of citizens to reward good or punish bad government performance 
(Roberts 2014). Considering its multidimensionality, the use of accurate measures 
to capture the concept and to reliably test its effect on government responsiveness is 
of paramount importance. Following recent research which has successfully tested 
the consistency of three items for the measurement of the underlying concept (Pickel 
et al. 2016; Quaranta 2017), the main explanatory variable is based on the following 
ones:
– In country the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the gov-
ernment (0–10)
– In country the government explains its decisions to voters (0–10)
Fig. 1  Mean scores for each country of the variable ‘perception of government responsiveness’. Note 
Perception of government responsiveness (0–10)—mean scores
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– In country governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a 
bad job (0–10)
The first two items measure the answerability/ transparency dimension of account-
ability, while the third item measures the enforcement/ control dimension (Ferrin 
and Kriesi 2016; Morlino 2011; Schedler 1999). The theoretical relevance of the 
three items along with the high correlation scores suggests to combine them into one 
variable using Confirmatory Factor Analysis.7
Table 1  Confirmatory factor analysis for the latent variable ‘perception of electoral accountability’
Indicators Loadings Uniqueness
Election sanction when government do a bad job 0.630 0.603
Government explains decisions to voters 0.795 0.368
Media provide citizens with reliable information 0.519 0.731
N 47,515
Fig. 2  Mean scores for each country of the latent variable ‘perception of electoral accountability’. Note 
Perception of Electoral Accountability (0–10)—mean scores
7 A general item measuring accountability could risk to sound very similar to responsiveness to most 
respondent, resulting in biased measurement and assessment of the main relationship. The battery 
included in this ESS round allowed instead to build (and employ) a more accurate and theoretically 
underpinned measure of electoral accountability. The exogeneity of the main relationship is also sug-
gested by the rather low correlation coefficient between the two variables (r = 0.471).
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Table 1 displays the results of the latent variable model. The estimates confirm 
the presence of one underlying dimension and that the three items make a relevant 
contribution to it. The factor scores were then computed to build the new variable 
measuring individual perception of electoral accountability, ranging from 0 to 10. 
Figure 2 shows the difference in citizens’ perception of accountability presenting the 
mean scores calculated for each country included in the analysis.8
Moderating variables
The second part of the analysis assesses the moderating effect of three aspects of 
the party system on the accountability-responsiveness link. Given that the countries 
included in the analysis show a considerable variation in their institutional charac-
teristics, all the moderating variables are collected at the country-level. To meas-
ure party system fragmentation, I use the Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective 
number of electoral parties (ENEP) as collected by Gallagher9 (2015). The stability 
of the party system is measured by the Pedersen index of net volatility10 that theo-
retically ranges from 0, where no party loses votes, to 100, where all the votes go to 
new parties not present in the previous election. I derived data on Western European 
countries from Dassonneville (2015), while data on volatility in Central and Eastern 
Europe are obtained by Powell and Tucker (2014). Finally, the index of polarization 
is the one designed by Dalton (2008) and computed by the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Volkens et al. 2013). The index ranges from 0, indicating that parties have 
the same ideological position on the left–right scale, to 10, indicating a party system 
where all the parties are on the extremes of the ideological scale.11
Control variables
In order to control for differences at the country-level, the models include also the 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP collected in the World Development Indica-
tors database (World Bank 2013). At the individual-level I include traditional socio-
demographic controls for gender (dummy), age (in full years), education level (high-
est level attained), perception of income household (on a reversed four-point scale) 
8 To assess the reliability of this latent variable I run a correlation test with an objective measure of 
accountability, the Vertical Accountability Index annually elaborated by the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) Institute (Coppedge et al. 2018). The result confirms a strong and highly significant correlation 
(R = 0.670***) between the two measures.
9 In order to test its conditional effect, it is important to capture the effect of fragmentation in a broader 
sense, i.e. also outside the parliamentary arena. In line with previous studies analysing dynamic repre-
sentation and party system fragmentation (e.g. Wlezien and Soroka 2012), the use of ENEP allows to 
include all the parties competing in the system rather than only those represented in parliament or in gov-
ernment. See Table A.3 in the Supplementary Material.
10 See Table A.3 in the Supplementary Material.
11 See Table A.3 in the Supplementary Material.
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along with controls for political attitudes such as winner/loser status12 (dummy), the 
level of political interest (reversed four-point scale), closeness to any party (dummy) 
and the level of political trust (0–10).13 However, given that these controls are not 
the principal focus of this study they will not be discussed in the results.
Methodology
Since the analysis is based on data collected at individual- and contextual-level I 
employ Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) to estimate different effects among vari-
ables with random intercepts accounting for unobserved heterogeneity among coun-
tries (Gelman and Hill 2007). Individual respondents (level 1) are nested into coun-
tries (level 2) that have different sets of parameters for the random factors, allowing 
intercepts and the individual-level coefficients for accountability perception to vary 
by nation.
Results
Table  2 presents hierarchical linear regression models (Models 1–4) in which the 
four hypotheses are tested. All the models estimate citizens’ evaluations of govern-
ment responsiveness in relation to individual perceptions of electoral accountability. 
Model 0 accounts for the adoption of the multilevel methodology of analysis. Model 
1 presents the first hypothesis concerning the direct effect of perceptions of elec-
toral accountability on evaluations of government responsiveness. Model 2 tests the 
conditional effect of party system fragmentation on the ‘sanction-policy’ linkage. 
Model 3 includes the cross-level interaction of party system volatility on the main 
relation. Finally, Model 4 presents the moderating effect of party system polariza-
tion on the link between accountability and responsiveness. Since the sample counts 
less than 30 observations at the level 2, estimations of models with more than one 
cross-level interaction might be problematic and confidence intervals risk to be 
severely biased. Following Stegmueller’s (2013) recommendations, I include only 
one cross-level interaction per model.
The ‘intercept-only’ model (Model 0) confirms that the country level 
accounts for a substantial amount of variance in the dependent variable. The 
13 For an overview and the descriptive statistics of the variables see Table A.1 and Table A.2 and in the 
Supplementary Material. Following an approach usually adopted in the literature (Marien and Werner 
2018), political trust is measured by the latent variable obtained with the factor analysis of three items, 
namely ‘trust in parliament’, ‘trust in parties’, and ‘trust in politicians’. Results of the latent variable 
model are reported in Table A.4 in the Supplementary Material.
12 Including a control for winner/loser status is particularly relevant for the analysis. As Cho (2010, p. 
1655) shows, if voters feel that elections allows the party they support to end up in government, they 
are more likely to perceive representative institutions as responsive to their needs. On the other hand, if 
the parties they support lose elections, they are more likely to feel that “their voice is excluded from the 
decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with political institutions”.
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intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) indicates that about 21% of the total vari-
ance is explained at country level, supporting the decision to perform a multilevel 
analysis.
I therefore run four random intercept models that control for country-specific 
effects to ensure that unobserved differences between countries are not driving key 
findings. The first model tests, from the perspective of citizens, whether a more 
accountable government makes it also more responsive toward their preferences 
 (H1). Results presented in Model 1 support the assumptions of the ‘anticipatory 
representation’ model (Erikson et al. 2002; Mansbridge 2003) according to which 
the threat of punishment guaranteed by the existence of an effective accountability 
mechanism would push governments to adopt more responsive behaviour. The coef-
ficients indicate that if the perception of electoral accountability increases by one 
unit, the public perception of government responsiveness increases by 0.456 on a 
scale from 0 to 10. Finally, the slope variance of the main independent variable is 
close to zero, indicating that the strength of the sanction-policy linkage from the 
perspective of citizens shows very little variation across countries. Nevertheless, the 
potential conditional effect of the party system on the main relationship is investi-
gated in the three interaction models.
Model 2 tests the conditional effect of fragmentation using the Laakso and Taa-
gepera’s (1979) effective number of parties. The negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient corroborates the second hypothesis and is confirmed by the marginal 
effect plotted in Fig. 3. In contexts where fragmentation is lower (e.g. Hungary or 
Spain) a one-unit change in the perception of electoral accountability increases the 
level of government responsiveness by 0.589 on a scale from 0 to 10. Conversely, 
in highly fragmented party systems like Belgium or Israel, the marginal effect of 
accountability perception on assessments of government responsiveness is signifi-
cantly reduced by almost one-sixth (to 0.101).
Fig. 3  Effect of electoral 
accountability on responsive-
ness depending on the level of 
party system fragmentation. 
Note The figure shows the 
estimated marginal effect of a 
one-unit change in perceptions 
of electoral accountability on 
the perceived responsiveness of 
government, conditional on the 
fragmentation of the party sys-
tem. All estimates and the 95% 
confidence interval are based on 
Model 2, Table 2
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The second institutional factor I expect to moderate the sanction-policy link is 
party system volatility. The interaction coefficient presented in Model 3 supports the 
third hypothesis: the positive and statistically significant effect suggests that in con-
texts characterized by well-institutionalized and stable party systems, accountability 
perceptions have a stronger positive effect on responsiveness assessments. Figure 4 
presents the marginal effect of accountability perception for different levels of party 
system fragmentation. It shows the strong link between accountability and respon-
siveness evaluations in well-institutionalized party systems like Norway, Cyprus or 
Fig. 4  Effect of electoral 
accountability on responsive-
ness depending on the level of 
party system volatility. Note The 
figure shows the estimated mar-
ginal effect of a one-unit change 
in perceptions of electoral 
accountability on the perceived 
responsiveness of government, 
conditional on the volatility of 
the party system. All estimates 
and the 95% confidence interval 
are based on Model 3, Table 2
Fig. 5  Effect of electoral 
accountability on responsive-
ness depending on the level 
of party system polarization. 
Note The figure shows the 
estimated marginal effect of a 
one-unit change in perceptions 
of electoral accountability on 
the perceived responsiveness of 
government, conditional on the 
polarization of the party system. 
All estimates and the 95% 
confidence interval are based on 
Model 4, Table 2
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the UK. Here the marginal effect of electoral accountability on responsiveness is 
0.625, while it significantly decreases by moving towards more volatile party sys-
tems (e.g. Slovakia, Slovenia or Lithuania) where a one-unit change in perception of 
accountability increases responsiveness’ coefficient by only 0.075.
Finally, Model 4 reports the interaction coefficient of party system polarization 
on the main relationship (Hypothesis 4). In this case results do not support the theo-
retical expectation that highly polarized party systems—i.e. where government par-
ties are more cohesive and distinct from the opposition parties—would reinforce the 
sanction-policy link. Although the coefficient of the interaction is in the expected 
direction (positive), it fails to reach the conventional levels of significance, indicat-
ing that varying levels of party system polarization do not affect the relation between 
perceptions of accountability and assessments of responsiveness (see Fig. 5).
Discussion and conclusion
Moving from the extensive contribution of competitive democratic theory, estab-
lished literature on dynamic representation, and emerging research analysing elec-
toral incentives on policy responsiveness, this article aimed to investigate the effect 
of public perceptions of accountability on assessments of government responsive-
ness across 25 European countries. The main argument builds on the thermostat 
model of representation (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995) and the rational 
anticipation theory (Erikson et  al. 2002; Mansbridge 2003), according to which 
governments respond to changes in citizens’ preferences in order to maximize their 
chances of re-election. The article employed individual assessments of vertical 
accountability and government responsiveness to analyse this mechanism across dif-
ferent countries and provide an understanding of the functioning of democratic rep-
resentation in practice.
The analysis confirmed the existence of a ‘sanction-policy link’ from the per-
spective of citizens, showing that public perceptions of government responsiveness 
are influenced by the extent to which people perceive the government as account-
able. The effect is consistent across both established and relatively young European 
democracies with very different characteristics, an element that allows to generalize 
findings and increases their validity. The use of survey data to analyse dynamic rep-
resentation has several merits. First, it provides a significant complementary per-
spective to the traditional approach adopted to study the effect of electoral incen-
tives on policy responsiveness (Bernardi 2018; Erikson et  al. 2002; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008; Mansbridge 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). The analysis of 
citizens’ attitudes, in fact, supports the indication that the threat of alternation and 
replacement of unresponsive representatives would spur governments to adopt an 
‘anticipatory behaviour’ and act responsively toward citizens’ preferences. Moreo-
ver, the analysis of citizens’ perceptions allows to understand directly how success-
ful are the (policy) measures put in place by governments and what makes people 
satisfied with them. This is extremely relevant, given that extensive research shows 
the importance of supportive attitudes to achieve and strengthen democratic legiti-
macy (Scharpf 2006).
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Building on the recent literature about the effect of political institutions on 
dynamic representation (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Rasmussen et  al. 2018; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Wlezien and Soroka 2012), the article analysed whether 
and how specific characteristics of the party system moderate the sanction-policy 
link from the perspective of citizens. The sixth round of the European Social Survey 
collects data from 25 democracies showing a very high degree of systemic variation 
in terms of number of parties and levels of party polarization or volatility. Results 
from multilevel analysis support two of the three theoretical expectations. While no 
evidence is found about the effect of polarization on the sanction-policy link, the 
relationship between perception of accountability and assessment of responsiveness 
turns out to be weaker in presence of highly fragmented and volatile party systems. 
In line with Wlezien and Soroka’s (2012) findings at the aggregate-level, the pre-
sent study shows that a great number and diversity of parties in the system is detri-
mental for representation in between elections. In highly fragmented party systems 
the positive effect of accountability on responsiveness decreases, weakening the 
sanction-policy link from the perspective of citizens. Beside this, the analysis has 
also revealed that higher levels of party system volatility could moderate dynamic 
representation by weakening perceptions of electoral accountability and, in turn, 
evaluations of democratic responsiveness. This is particularly relevant in the light 
of a recent process of ‘de-institutionalization’ investing Western European party sys-
tems and that gradually makes them closer to the traditionally more volatile Central 
and Eastern European neighbours (Emanuele et al. 2018). These results suggest the 
existence a potential representation deficit triggered by dysfunctional party systems, 
and that could have negative consequences for the legitimacy of the democratic 
system.
In conclusion, the present article has provided additional support to the antici-
patory representation and thermostatic models of representation by analysing, for 
the first time, this mechanism from the perspective of citizens. Moreover, the study 
of the conditional effect of the party system across several European countries rep-
resents a contribution to the emergent research agenda investigating the potential 
effect of political institutions on dynamic representation.
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